Strategic interaction with multiple tools : a new empirical model by Richards, Timothy James (Author) et al.
  MSABR 02-08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report is also available online at http://agb.east.asu.edu/workingpapers/0208.pdf 
 
 
 
Morrison School of Agribusiness and Resource Management 
 
Faculty Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Interaction with Multiple Tools:  A New 
Empirical Model 
 
 
 
Timothy J. Richards and Paul M. Patterson 
 
 
February 16, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Interaction with Multiple Tools: 
A New Empirical Model 
by 
Timothy J. Richards and Paul M. Patterson1 
Short Title: Strategic Interaction 
1  Authors are Associate Professors, Morrison School of Agribusiness, Arizona State 
University East, 7001 E. Williams Field Road, Bldg. 20, Mesa, AZ. 85212. Phone: 480-727-1488 
FAX: 480-727-1510 email: trichards@asu.edu.  Contact author: Richards.  Financial support for 
the National Institute for Commodity Promotion and Research Evaluation of Cornell University 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
Strategic Interaction with Multiple Tools: 
A New Empirical Model 
Abstract 
The Lanchester model of strategic interaction typically considers only two-firm rivalry and one 
strategic tool.  This paper presents an alternative that considers rivalry among several firms using 
multiple tools.  Marketing decisions are dynamically optimal and use equations of motion for 
market share that are consistent with optimal consumer choice.  Using a single-market case study 
that consists of five years of monthly data on ready to eat cereal sales, advertising, product 
development investments and new product introductions, we test our model against a similar 
Lanchester specification.  Non-nested specification tests fail to reject the proposed model, but 
reject the Lanchester alternative.  
keywords: advertising, brands, cereal, dynamic, Lanchester, oligopoly, strategic interaction. 
Introduction 
Although researchers agree that marketing activities such as advertising, promotion or product 
development have persistent sales effects, there is considerable debate over their fundamental 
cause and how to model them (Feichtinger, Hartl, and Sethi, 1994).  In fact, there are two broad 
model types that appear in the marketing and industrial organization literatures: (1) Nerlove-
Arrow, or “goodwill” models, and (2) Lanchester, or “market share” models.  Among the first 
studies to recognize the dynamic impact of advertising, Nerlove and Arrow (1962) maintain that 
advertising expenditures are in fact investments in long-lived capital assets they termed 
“goodwill.”  Because goodwill is both slow to develop and depreciates slowly over time once 
established, the impact of an investment made in one period can be felt for many periods into the 
future so economic models that describe the effect of advertising on sales must be inherently 
dynamic.  On the other hand, Vidale and Wolfe (1957) and Kimball (1957) develop an 
alternative characterization, based on Lanchester’s models of battlefield strategy, that assumes 
advertising instead acts directly on the rate of change of sales or, more precisely, on the evolution 
of a firm’s market share.  Theoretical and empirical advances based on these two different 
approaches tend to follow independent paths through the marketing literature (Deal 1979; Sorger 
1989; Erickson 1992; Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1992, 1994) and in the context of empirical 
dynamic oligopoly games in the economics literature (Roberts and Samuelson 1988; Gasmi, 
Laffont, and Vuong 1992; Slade 1995).  Each of the disparate strains of research attempt to 
achieve similar objectives, but rarely do they address the appropriateness or value of the others’ 
approach.  However, there appears to be great value in achieving a synthesis of these two 
approaches. 
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Whereas the state variable in Nerlove and Arrow-type models is the stock of goodwill 
itself, the state variable Lanchester-type models is instead market share.  Feichtinger, Hartl, and 
Sethi (1994) review the considerable literature on advertising dynamics.  Despite the rather 
compelling logic of either approach, each has its conceptual and empirical strengths and 
weaknesses.  Whereas the notion of advertising as contributing to a capital asset that has a lasting 
effect on sales is intuitively plausible, Nerlove - Arrow models are difficult to apply because 
goodwill is inherently latent or unobservable and its rate of depreciation is typically 
underidentified in most empirical applications.  On the other hand, although the market-share 
state variable in a Lanchester model is readily observable, this approach is highly restrictive in 
that it allows only a limited number of rivals, it implies no aggregate sales impact, and the 
equations of motion for market share are not based in a rigorous model of firm optimization but 
are rather conjectures that seem logically sound.  Despite the potentially contrary implications 
that may emerge from each of these approaches, no previous studies directly test one against the 
other as an appropriate explanation for sales dynamics.  Nor do they attempt to address some of 
the limitations of existing models in order to develop one that combines the best features of each. 
Beyond the methodological question of which empirical approach is most appropriate, 
very little research considers the strategic impact of a firm’s simultaneous use of many different 
marketing tools, namely price, product development, new product introduction and advertising.2 
While several consider either advertising alone (Deal, 1979; Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; 
2 W e include both product development expenditures and new product introductions in order to capture the 
fact that not all product investment results in new brands, but often is used to conduct basic research in innovative 
new products or to improve taste or packaging attributes of existing products.  In this sense, product development 
expenditures are a proxy measure of a firm’s investment in quality and reputation.  
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Sorger, 1989; Erickson, 1992,1997, and many others) or price and advertising together (Liang, 
1986; Slade, 1995), none consider product development product line extensions as either 
substitutes for, or more likely complements to, advertising and price strategies.  With some 
25,000 new products introduced to supermarkets alone in 1999 (Food Institute Report) and 95% 
of those failing to exist beyond the required six month proving period, product development and 
new product introduction represent some of the most significant and risky investments 
undertaken by a firm.  This is particularly true for the firms that constitute the empirical example 
used in this paper -- ready-to-eat cereal manufacturers.  Few industries are more active in 
developing new products and in using strategic new product introductions as a competitive tool 
(Liang, 1986; Hausman, 1997; Erickson, 1997; Nevo, 2001).  Further, with slotting fees for new 
products now estimated at more than $250,000 for some categories (FTC Hearings) for a single 
retail grocery chain in addition to significant investment in developing and promoting a new 
product, maximizing the probability of success is now paramount.  While pricing strategies for 
new products (Dockner and Jorgensen, 1988; Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1999) and 
the strategic motives for product line changes (Brander and Eaton, 1984; Bayus and Putsis, 1999; 
Kadiyali, Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1996, 1999) are relatively well understood, the strategic 
interplay of these decisions with investments in product research and the use of various 
advertising and promotion techniques remains to be thoroughly studied.  Particularly in the case 
of cereal manufacturers, it is also not clear whether such non-price tools obviate the need for 
strict price competition. 
Despite the central role that price-rivalry plays in much of the literature (Liang, 1986; 
Slade, 1995; Cotterill and Putsis, 2000) competition in prices is typically a maintained 
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assumption and authors do not test against any alternatives.  Rather, rivalry in quantities may be 
more appropriate if manufacturers have market share goals that are achieved through non-price 
tools. Arguing that price is a strategic variable, Liang (1986) and Cotterill and Putsis (2000) 
estimate direct (price-independent) demand systems simultaneously with price-response 
equations.  However, if quantities are truly endogenous, then a more correct approach is to 
estimate an indirect demand system simultaneously with quantity-response equations.  In this 
study, we conduct specification tests to determine which provides a better fit to the data.  
The objectives of this paper are, therefore, both substantive and methodological.  Our 
primary objective is to obtain a better understanding of the strategic roles played by product 
development, new product introduction, advertising, and market share rivalry in the ready-to-eat 
cereal industry.  In order to achieve this goal, however, it is necessary to examine the adequacy of 
the existing methodological orthodoxy in this area and to rigorously test against equally viable 
alternatives.  Consequently, our second objective is to develop a model of strategic rivalry that 
represents a synthesis of existing models and to determine whether this model provides a better 
fit to the data than models currently in popular use.  In order to achieve these objectives, we 
follow Slade (1995) and Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1996) by adopting a case-study 
empirical approach.  Specifically, we estimate our model with market-level scanner data from a 
single metropolitan market (Baltimore / Washington, D.C.) for one product category (ready-to-
eat cereals).  
The paper begins by developing two alternative conceptual models of strategic rivalry. 
Next, we present econometric models that follow from each.  We then explain the techniques 
necessary to estimate these models and provide a detailed description of the ready-to-eat cereal 
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data.  A discussion of the estimation results follows, both in terms of specification tests and tests 
of specific hypothesis generated from the conceptual models.  The final section presents our 
empirical results, provides a discussion of some implications and suggests avenues for future 
research. 
Conceptual Model of Market Share Rivalry 
Although valuable in terms of their parsimony and ability to explain complex dynamic 
interrelationships between firms, Lanchester-type models have several weaknesses that limit their 
generality.  First, in order to retain the mathematical tractability of dealing with only one state 
variable, the basic Lanchester framework is only able to analyze duopoly situations (Sorger, 
1989; Chintagunta and Jain, 1995; and many others).  Erickson (1997) recognizes this weakness 
by extending the model to include dynamic conjectural variation terms wherein several 
competitors respond to changes in market share with contingent advertising strategies.  Structural 
game theoretic models, however, do not face the same restrictions on the number of potential 
rivals because they do not purport to solve for equilibrium control paths.  For example, Slade 
(1995) employs a differential game approach similar to Karp and Perloff (1993) in analyzing 
both price and advertising competition among rival brands of crackers in a local oligopolistic 
market.  Similarly, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1992) are of 
this same broad class of model, but rather focus on the problem of estimating strategic responses 
among duopolistic rivals using multiple tools.  
Despite their application to duopolistic market structures, these studies address a second 
limitation of Lanchester-type models, namely their analysis of only one strategic tool.  Although 
notable exceptions exist -- Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1994), for example, consider the roles of 
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both advertising and detailing in a duopoly framework --  these studies typically estimate 
dynamic models and simulate optimal dynamic solutions, so consideration of multiple tools is 
usually infeasible.  
A third potential weakness of Lanchester-type models has yet to be addressed in the 
literature.  While differential equations describing the evolution of duopoly market share are 
mathematically plausible and admit a simple yet powerful solution technique, they are ad hoc as 
they are not grounded in any theoretical model of consumer optimization.  Rather, market share 
should evolve according to consumers’ responses to firms’ various marketing activities. 
Chingtagunta and Rao (1996) develop a model of optimal strategic pricing based on a random 
utility model of consumer choice, but their use of a single-control steady-state framework 
prevents them from considering the interaction of several possible marketing tools.  By 
grounding our strategic-marketing model in consumer theory, we are able to estimate a system of 
equations and matrix of response elasticities that better describe the likely outcome of market 
share rivalry. 
The model we propose addresses each of these weaknesses by developing a synthesis of 
Nerlove - Arrow and Lanchester-type models.  First, by treating each firm within an oligopoly as 
being in an “us versus the rest of them” battle for market share, we are able to condense a 
potentially intractable oligopoly problem into one that is mathematically manageable.  This is a 
realistic approach in that oligopolistic firms rarely single-out particular rivals for a targeted price 
cut or advertising campaign.  Second, we explicitly account for the fact that marketing strategies 
can, and do, include choices over several marketing variables and that these choices are 
endogenous to market performance and rival strategies.  Consequently, we specify a fully 
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simultaneous model of product demand and marketing variable choice.  Chintagunta and Jain 
(1995), Liang (1986) and Cotterill and Putsis (2000) demonstrate the importance of 
simultaneously estimating market-share response equations with equations representing the 
optimal choice of each strategic marketing tool.  This approach has been applied in the duopoly-
game theory literature by Roberts and Samuelson (1988) in the cigarette industry, Gasmi and 
Vuong (1991), and Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1992) in the soft drink market, and Liang (1986) 
in the ready-to-eat cereal industry.  It has not, however, been used to estimate an oligopoly model 
with multiple decision variables.  Third, we base the dynamics governing market share in a 
model of consumer optimization, so strategic interaction impacts firm performance not directly, 
but through demand for their product.  This is a more realistic and plausible motivation for the 
evolution of market share over time in a rivalrous environment.  By incorporating these three 
features into a model of strategic rivalry, we hope to create a synthesis that performs better than 
existing models. 
We assess the relative performance of these models using two non-nested testing 
methods: (1) the J-test of Davidson and Mackinnon , and (2) the likelihood dominance criterion 
(LDC) of Pollak and Wales (1991).  With these tests, we are able to determine which of the 
3market share rivalry specifications is more appropriate to our particular data set.   Although the J-
test is popular due to its compelling logic and ease of calculation, it frequently provides 
indecisive results.  Therefore, we also use the LDC test to either refute or corroborate the J-test 
3 If the explanatory variables of the two models were the same, Barten’s method of constructing a 
composite model that nests the two approaches would be the preferred way to select the better specification.  In our 
case, however, the dependent variables are the same and the explanatory variables differ so the models are not nested 
in any way and construction of a composite model would be unnecessarily difficult. 
7 
result. With these tests, the data determine which model represents a better description of the 
strategic interactions that are occurring in the industry, rather than the modeler alone.  With a 
formal comparison of the performance of our new model with one that represents the current 
orthodoxy, we intend to demonstrate the potential value of the synthetic model in improving the 
quality of information available on the relative effectiveness of different types of marketing 
activity.   
In this section, we develop two structural models of strategic interaction -- the first based 
in Lanchester’s model of market share rivalry, and the second based on a system of consumer 
demand equations.  We begin with an extension of the well-understood Lanchester approach. 
With this model, firms are assumed to maximize the present value of future profits subject to the 
dynamic evolution of their market share, which is in turn determined by the nature of the 
strategic response of their rivals.  In a duopoly model, the single state variable is defined in terms 
of firm i’s market share (M ) so that rival market share is the simple complement of this: Mj = 1 ­i 
Mi. From the perspective of firm i, however, they are more likely to be in an oligopoly than a 
true duopoly, so are more concerned with the share of the market served by all others rather than 
a specific rival firm. This represents a very general and simple extension of the Lanchester 
duopoly model to the oligopoly case where the equation of motion for the market share of firm i 
is written as: 
(1) 
for all i firms, where M  = 1 - M  is the market share of all other firms,  is the change in -i i 
thmarket share of the i  firm, and Aij, A-ij  are a set of j marketing tools available to firm i and all 
8
other firms, respectively.  In the empirical application to follow, this set of tools consists of firm-
level advertising, product development expenditure, number of distinct brands (product line 
length) and average shelf price.  In this general form for firm i’s market share dynamics, $
measures the effectiveness of the particular strategic tool, whereas " provides an estimate of its 
curvature.  Usually, " is assumed to be 0.5, so each element of the marketing mix demonstrates 
diminishing marginal returns typical of the square root function.  To maintain comparability with 
existing research, we adopt this convention as well.  Further, we include the parameter M to 
account for the possibility that market share adjustment from one period to the next is costly, so 
it is not instantaneous if firms behave optimally.  Equation (1) forms the basis of the Lanchester 
model of market share rivalry.  Despite its simplicity, intuitive appeal, and considerable empirical 
support, it nonetheless rests on an ad hoc specification for the evolution of market share. 
Rather, a firm’s market share does not respond directly in response to the actions of 
rivals, but through the consequence of consumers’ responses to those actions.  The Lanchester 
model ignores this fact, so any dynamic solution is necessarily ad hoc, even if it is fully optimal 
with respect to its own equations of motion.  On the other hand, directly specified consumer 
demand functions describe the direct impact of marketing tools on aggregate consumer budget, 
and hence, market shares.  By selecting the appropriate demand specification, the equations of 
motion for market share can describe optimal consumer behavior.  From among the large class of 
functional forms that are consistent with utility maximization, we choose the linear version of 
Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model.  Originally 
developed as a direct demand system, in which prices are assumed to be exogenous, there is 
some question in this case as to whether prices or quantities are more plausibly assumed to be 
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exogenous. For example, Liang (1986) and Cotterill and Putsis (2000) specify simultaneous 
systems of demand and price-response equations, arguing that prices are endogenous choice 
variables.  Indeed, Cotterill and Putsis (2000) use a direct linear approximate AIDS (LA / AIDS) 
model to estimate both the demand for ready to eat cereals and price-response equations in 
simultaneous, three-stage-least squares framework.  While this approach is consistent in an 
econometric sense, if prices are indeed endogenous as the authors argue, then the demand system 
itself should be written in inverse, or price-dependent form with firm-level quantities as 
explanatory variables.  Evidence of high cereal prices (Cotterill, 1999) does not necessarily mean 
that price is a competitive variable, but rather suggests the opposite – that firms cooperate in 
holding prices relatively high and compete for market share using other means.  Ultimately, 
therefore, the appropriate form of the demand-and-response system is an empirical question.  
     We resolve this question using a series of Wu-Hausman specification tests (Hausman, 1978), 
which is a common method of testing for price or quantity endogeneity (Eales and Unnevehr, 
1993). Comparing an estimator that is consistent under both the null and alternative hypotheses 
with one that is efficient under the null hypothesis yields a chi-square statistic of 64.733 when 
prices are specified as exogenous and 1,340.241 when quantities are considered exogenous.  This 
result provides strong evidence that prices are exogenous, but quantities are not.  Because it is 
not appropriate to specify price as the primary competitive variable in these data, we use an 
inverse AIDS (IAIDS) model and estimate with fully simultaneous methods in a manner similar 
to Moschini and Vissa (1992) or  Eales and Unnevehr (1993).  Consequently, we describe this 
model in some detail next. 
Derivation of the IAIDS model begins from a distance function analogous to Deaton and 
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Muellbauer’s (1980) PIGLOG expenditure function: 
(2) 
where q is a vector of quantities.  Eales and Unnevehr (1993) define a(q) and b(q) as:4 
(3) 
Substituting these expressions into the distance function (2), differentiating with respect to 
quantities, and solving for each of the i budget shares leads to an estimable system: 
(4) 
where M  is the budget share of firm i, and Q is a total quantity index, commonly approximated i 
with Stone’s quantity index:   Theoretical conditions of homogeneity, adding 
up, and symmetry can be imposed on the system, and thereby tested through simple likelihood 
ratio tests with the following set of restrictions: 
(5) 
Although it is more usual to specify a full system of separable goods, or brands in this case, we 
model oligopolistic rivalry among cereal manufacturers with a set of equations that represent 
each firm’s share as a function of own quantity and all others.  This not only makes the model 
4 This distance function is assumed to be linearly homogenous, concave, non-decreasing in Q  and 
decreasing in u (Eales and Unnevehr 1993).  
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more parsimonious, but is consistent with our objective of condensing an oligopolistic problem 
into a set of single-state variable duopoly models, each of which is comparable to the more 
traditional Lanchester specification.  To aid in interpreting the structural parameters, which are of 
little meaning themselves, the price and scale flexibilities in the linear-approximate version are 
given by: 
(6) 
respectively, where *ij  is Kronecker’s delta.  In the inverse model, negative cross-flexibilities 
indicate gross quantity-substitutes, whereas positive cross-flexibilities suggest that the firms’ 
products are quantity-complements.  Similarly, products with scale flexibilities below -1.0 are 
termed necessities, while a scale flexibility above -1.0 indicates the firm’s output is a luxury.  In 
order to utilize (4) as an equation of motion for market share, however, we need to specify a 
more general version of this model that allows for dynamics in consumer choice, and their 
response to advertising and new product introduction.  
To incorporate consumer response, Pollak and Wales (1980) describe two methods of 
modifying the underlying utility structure to be consistent with either shifts in demand 
(translating) or pivoting the demand curve (scaling).  Because our interest lies in the effect of 
marketing tools on market share, we adopt the translating method and incorporate the log of 
advertising and new product count into the intercept of (4).  Second, as in the Lanchester model 
case, we develop a dynamic version of (4) by recognizing the fact that budget-share adjustment is 
a costly process as consumers seek out and try new varieties before changing their current 
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consumption patterns. In high frequency data such as that used below, these short-run costs of 
adjustment imply that budget shares adjust only partially toward their desired levels each period. 
This partial adjustment assumption is incorporated into (4) by writing each budget share equation 
in geometric lag form, with the coefficient on the lagged share representing the rate of adjustment 
per period (Heien and Wessels, 1990).  As a result, market share evolves according to the 
equations of motion described by the system of inverse demand equations: 
(7) 
for all i firms using j marketing tools, where 2 is the rate of market-share adjustment, q is thei 
unit volume sold by firm i , Q is the total quantity index, , is a random error term and the other 
variables are as defined above.  Notice that average price levels for each rival firm are implicitly 
endogenous with this specification, so they are strategic variables in the IAIDS model, but not the 
Lanchester model.  This is an important point of departure between the two models as industry 
observers note that intense non-price competition has led to tacit collusion in price among 
industry members (Cotterill, 1999).  With both models, therefore, we focus on the full set of 
strategic variables introduced above -- advertising, product development expenditures and 
product line manipulation -- in order to capture the complete strategic arsenal employed since the 
near-universal market share battles that arose in early 1996 (Corts 1998).  Several studies 
estimate the equations of motion alone and use these parameters to characterize a dynamic 
solution, but Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1994) note that this generates policy rules that assume 
firms behave according to the particular game that is played.  Rather, by estimating each firm’s 
actual response, we are better able to differentiate between behaviors under the actual game being 
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played (Liang, 1986; Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; Erickson, 1992; Chintagunta and Jain, 1995; 
Slade, 1995). With the competing market-share adjustment equations defined in (1) and (7), we 
derive equations that define the optimal strategic response in each marketing mix variable from 
the first order conditions of the firm’s dynamic optimization problem.  
Assuming each firm maximizes the discounted sum of future profits subject to the market 
share evolution described by either (1) or (7), the optimization problem becomes: 
(8) 
where g  is firm i’s gross margin per unit of sales and we assume each strategic variable is i 
expressed in expenditure or equivalent terms to facilitate comparison.  This objective function, 
together with the dynamic market share equations, describe a differential game that can be solved 
under assumptions of either a closed- or open-loop policy.  Essentially, an open-loop solution 
results in policy equations for each of advertising, product development, and brand introduction 
that are functions of time alone.  Therefore, the firm’s managers are assumed to commit to a 
particular trajectory for each and adhere to this strategy irrespective of the competitive 
environment. Alternately, if we assume that the firms play a non-cooperative game in each 
marketing tool in every time period, a closed-loop solution to (8) constitutes a Nash equilibrium 
where each decision variable is a function not only of time, but of the current state of the game. 
The state is, of course, summarized by the market share of firm i. As commonly recognized, 
solving this problem in more than two market shares ie. in an oligopoly, is analytically 
intractable.  Therefore, we adopt a new approach by considering the oligopoly solution as simply 
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a series of “us versus them” duopoly games.  This approach, while unique, is valuable in two 
respects.  First, it reduces the number of state variables, thus making what would otherwise be an 
intractable economic problem easily solvable with analytical methods.  Second, perspective is 
intuitively preferable because firms do not single-out rivals for targeted advertising or pricing 
strategies as the more traditional approach implies.  Rather, they set policies conditional on the 
strategic environment they face, where their particular environment may consist of any number of 
rivals.  By solving a similar problem for each firm in the industry, we derive share and response 
functions that capture each firm’s response to all other firms in the industry at once.  There are 
many examples of studies that use the simpler duopoly approach to arrive at analytical solutions 
for strategic variables such as price or advertising, and use parametric assumptions to simulate 
optimal control paths (Sorger, 1989; Erickson, 1992, Chintagunta and Vilcassim, 1992, 1994), 
however, we are concerned with only the first-stage of this problem.  Consequently, in the next 
section we derive the necessary conditions for a closed-loop solution to the game described 
above and them to derive an empirical model of strategic rivalry. 
These necessary conditions describe each firm’s dynamic optimal response for each 
element of its marketing mix.  Specifying optimal response equations along with the equations of 
motion for market share complete the market-share rivalry model for each firm.  First, we derive 
the optimal-response equations for the Lanchester model and then the IAIDS specification. 
Because the solution to a Lanchester duopoly game is well understood, however, we simply 
recognize that our approach represents an extension of existing solutions wherein a firm’s market 
share is the sole state variable.  Given this observation, the Hamiltonian representing the optimal 
control problem facing each firm is written: 
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(9) 
for each firm i and marketing tool j where 8 is the costate variable for firm i. To derive an 
estimable model, we take the solution derived by Sorger (1989) as given, and derive a 
corresponding solution to the IAIDS model below.  Specifically, the closed loop solution for each 
oligopolist under curvature conditions that are generally accepted in this literature (Erickson, 
1992, for example assumes ) yields response functions that are particularly 
appealing for econometric purposes, because they are linear in own-market share (Chintagunta 
and Jain, 1995): 
(10) 
and, for each set of rival firms: 
(11) 
where the aij  parameters solve the set of simultaneous equations given in Sorger (1989).  Notice 
from this expression that the cross-equation restrictions imply that a full-information method will 
be more efficient than a limited-information, or single-equation estimator.  An equivalent method 
provides a similar set of response equations for each firm and marketing tool in the IAIDS 
model. 
The critical difference between the IAIDS and Lanchester models is, however, that the 
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optimal response depends both upon a firm’s share of the market as well as the absolute quantity 
sold by each of its rivals due to the inverse demand specification.  To see this, we apply the 
maximum principle to the Hamiltonian defined for the IAIDS problem.  In this case, the 
Hamiltonian is: 
(12) 
Applying the Maximum Principle to (12) to find the stationary point with respect to Aij provides 
the necessary conditions for a Nash closed-loop solution: 
(13) 
for each firm i and instrument j, and the costate equation: 
(14) 
recognizing that  Differentiating (13) with respect to time, 
converting all time derivatives to their discrete-time counterparts, using the result to eliminate the 
costate variable in (14) and solving for the optimal response for instrument j by firm i gives an 
expression for Aij,t  that is a function only of the current state of the system: 
(15) 
Using a similar procedure to find the optimal, endogenous quantity (ie. market share) response 
leads to an analogous expression in market share and rival quantities: 
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(16) 
By estimating (15) and (16) together with the IAIDS equations of motion (7) with a non-linear 
three-stage-least-squares method, we account for the maintained endogeneity of output in the 
marketing response equations, and of marketing expenditure in the market share equations.  This 
approach also allows us to impose cross-equation restrictions between (7) and (15) that follow 
from the theoretical derivation of the IAIDS model.  As a result, the only unique parameter to be 
identified in the response equations is the firm-specific margin, g . On their own, however, these i 
structural parameters have little intuitive meaning for firm strategy.   
Response elasticities, on the other hand, provide unit-free estimates of the percentage 
change in a marketing tool by one firm in response to a given percentage change in another tool 
by a rival firm.  As such, these elasticities permit a common-size comparison of the strength of 
reaction among firms, and among the different tools at their disposal.  In the IAIDS model, these 
estimates are similar to the dynamic conjectural variations of Roberts and Samuelson (1988), or 
the synthetic conjectural parameters of Erickson (1997).  For the general case of tool j used by 
firm i, the response elasticity is: 
(17) 
recognizing that Stone’s quantity index is a weighted average of each firm’s quantity, where the 
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weights are endogenous in the IAIDS model.  Using these expressions, we test the null 
hypothesis that each is equal to zero using Wald chi-square tests.  Unlike Erickson (1997), who 
defines each firm’s marketing reaction function in terms of a rival firm’s market share, with these 
elasticities we define the conjecture directly in the marketing-mix space.  This is both necessary 
and convenient because each firm’s response to changes in its rivals’ market share (the state 
variable) is subsumed in (17) and the information contained in (17) is of more direct relevance to 
managers interested in strategic responses to decisions, rather than outcomes, from rival firms. 
Moreover, the statistical significance of these elasticities determine whether the solution is 
closed- or open-loop.      
Specifically, if these elasticities and the share-response parameters in the Lanchester 
model are both non-zero, then each model represents a closed-loop solution to the dynamic 
oligopoly marketing game.  However, each embodies a different hypothesis as to how 
competitive reactions are formed.  Whereas firms in the Lanchester model are assumed to 
respond directly to changes in market share, in the IAIDS model they respond to both share and 
aggregate market size.  Both of these solutions, however, represent closed-loop Nash equilibria 
in that the responses they describe reflect only the current state of the system.  In this sense, they 
are also sub-game perfect.  Open-loop solutions, on the other hand, depend only upon the initial 
state of the system and time so are, therefore, not sub-game perfect even though they remain 
Nash in that the oligopolist is doing the best that he can given that his rivals are doing likewise 
under the assumed rules of the game.  Based on our observation of firm behavior in the cereal 
industry, the only plausible model must describe a closed-loop solution as firms clearly do not 
commit to long-term marketing strategies independent of the competitive environment in the 
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industry.  The model selection tests described in the next section, therefore, provide evidence as 
to the nature of the competitive interaction among cereal manufacturers in the US -- whether they 
respond to changes in market share as hypothesized by the Lanchester model, or to changes in 
firm sales and total industry size as in the IAIDS model. 
Data and Methods 
To provide a comparison to existing research, we apply our model of market share rivalry to 
sales, advertising, product development, and product line data from the ready-to-eat cereal 
industry.  Specifically, we focus on the period following the industry-wide price cuts of early 
1996 in order to focus on the methods of competition in use since that time (Cotterill 1999).  By 
choosing this example, we are also able to compare our results to the dynamic conjectural 
variation model estimated by Erickson (1997).  This industry forms a particularly suitable 
example for our model because it is one of the most concentrated oligopolies in the packaged 
product industry, and one in which it is widely regarded that new product introductions do indeed 
form an important method of competitive foreclosure (Scherer 1990; Hausman 1997; Cotterill 
1999; Nevo 2001). Our data are from the IRI InfoScan database for the Baltimore / Washington 
market covering the four-weekly periods from the third quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 
1999. Over this period, the top five cereal companies (Kellogg, Post, General Mills, Quaker 
Oats, and Ralston) sold a total of 224 different cereal brands, some 84 of these were introduced 
during the sample period.  In order to capture the market-level impact of firm-level marketing 
strategies, it is necessary to use retail scanner data from all stores within a sample market, rather 
than aggregate out to a national-level data set.  This “case study” approach is now common 
among empirical studies of rivalry among consumer product firms (Slade, 1995; Kadiyali, 
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Vilcassim, and Chintagunta, 1996).  To summarize the scanner data, table 1 provides each firm’s 
average price, unit sales, and market share over the sample period.  Among the marketing 
strategy variables, both advertising and product development expenditure data are provided by 
firm records obtained from the Compustat financial database. Given that these data are available 
only on a quarterly basis, they are converted to four-weekly series using a cubic-spline smoothing 
algorithm.  Further, both of these variables necessarily reflect firm-wide strategies rather than 
market-level measures designed to increase local market share.  These assumptions are 
reasonable given that most advertising campaigns target national broadcast and print media, 
while defining product development spending on a market-level basis would be impossible and 
meaningless.  We calculate the number of brands for each company from the scanner data, 
adjusting each product line to allow for firm mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures over the 
sample period.  Because there are several periods during which Ralston had a zero market share, 
we exclude these cereals from all estimates and subsequent model selection tests. With the 
relatively short time period covered by these data and the low rate of prevailing inflation, all 
dollar values are in nominal rather than real terms.  Further, given that many of the explanatory 
variables in both models are endogenous, we estimate each using non-linear three-stage-least-
squares where the instruments include all exogenous and pre-determined variables in the model. 
Due to the fact that neither of these models is a special case of the other, and a synthetic model 
combining them both would be very large and difficult to estimate, so we test between them 
using non-nested testing methods.   
Anticipating the likelihood that one test alone will not provide conclusive evidence either 
for or against a particular model, we use three such non-nesting testing methods: (1) the J-test, 
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1 
(2) the likelihood dominance criterion, and (3) tests of prediction accuracy.  This section briefly 
describes these tests and explains how they are able to either determine which model provides a 
better representation of the data, or, failing a conclusive result, to rank the models according to a 
dominance criterion.  Davidson and McKinnon (1981) develop the J-test to select between two 
alternative models where one is not a special form of the other.  To carry out this test, we create a 
composite model that artificially nests the two competing hypotheses, written in generic notation 
as: 
(18) 
where the composite model that includes both specifications is written: 
(19) 
If H  is the correct model, " = 0, so a simple t-test can be used to either reject or fail to reject the 
hypothesis.  The problem with the test as written in (18) above is that " is not identified in that 
form. Consequently, Davidson and McKinnon (1981) suggest estimating an alternative where 
the fitted values of are used instead.  Conducting a similar test with H  as the maintained 2 
hypothesis ensures that the conclusions of the test are not due to the particular specification 
chosen to be represented as fitted values in the other.  Although this test is relatively simple to 
implement, it does not rule out the possibility of an inconclusive result -- one in which either 
both or none of the models is rejected in favor of the other.  In anticipation of this eventuality, 
therefore, we also use a non-nested test that does not rely on the estimation of a formal composite 
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model, but only on the likelihood function values of each competing model.  Specifically, Pollak 
and Wales (1991) develop the likelihood dominance criterion (LDC) to test non-nested 
alternatives when estimation of the composite model is unfeasible.  The reasoning behind the 
LDC lies in comparing the likelihood function values from each competing model to that of a 
fictitious composite model.  Define the “adjusted likelihood value” for alternative i as: 
(20) 
where L  is the likelihood value for alternative i, and C is the critical chi-square value for degrees i 
of freedom equal to the difference between the parametric size of the composite (n ) andc 
maintained (n ) models. Pollak and Wales (1991) show that if V  > V  there is no value of the 1 2 1 
composite likelihood function value that would suggest accepting H  and rejecting H .  Thus, H1 2 2 
is said to dominate H .  Clearly, the opposite reasoning holds if the inequality is reversed. 1
Developing the LDC from this logic in terms of the likelihood function values gives the 
following set of rules: 
(1) LDC prefers H  to H  if L  - L1  < [C(n  + 1) - C(n  + 1) ] / 2 1 2 2 2 1 
(2) LDC indecisive if  [C( n2 - n1 + 1) - C(1) ] / 2 > L  - L1 > [C(n  + 1) - C(n  + 1) ] / 2 2 2 1 
(3) LDC prefers H  to H  if L  - L1  > [C( n2 - n1 + 1) - C(1) ] / 2.2 1 2 
Although this method still admits the possibility of an inconclusive result, it nonetheless provides 
a selection method that avoids the same type of ambiguity inherent in the J-test.  By using both, 
we are more likely to be able to determine which of the IAIDS or Lanchester models provides a 
better description of dynamic rivalry in the cereal industry.  If neither of these comparisons 
provides a conclusive result, however, there remains a third method of model selection that 
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approaches the problem from an entirely different perspective. 
Namely, many argue that the best model is the one that is able to forecast more 
accurately, whether in sample or out of sample.  This is particularly true for models that are 
intended to be used for managerial guidance rather than testing economic hypotheses.  To this 
end, we compare the two specification’s based on two similar measures of forecast accuracy: (1) 
the root mean square error, and (2) Theil’s U (Theil, 1961).  Although Theil’s U and the RMSE 
are both based on a measure of quadratic loss, the former normalizes the sum of squared 
deviations of the forecast from actual by the square of each realized value to produce a unit-free 
measure that is comparable among different data sets.  These measures are calculated using the 
following formulae for RMSE: 
(21) 
and Theil’s U: 
(22) 
where M is the number of observations in the forecast data set and is the forecasted value of 
market share.  Notice that a perfect forecast implies a U value of zero.  With these measures -­
the J-test, the LDC, RMSE and Theil’s U -- providing three conceptually-different indicators of 
model performance, any corroboration between them would provide strong evidence in support 
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of the favored model.  One caveat to these results must be noted.  Namely, given the limited 
number of observations for each company’s sales available to this study, we do not attempt to 
compare out-of-sample forecast accuracy, but calculate these measures over the entire sample 
data set for each model.  Based on the results of these model selection tests presented in the next 
section, we interpret the structural elasticities and conjectural response parameters from the 
preferred model.   
Results and Discussion 
Much has been written regarding the marketing strategies of the largest cereal manufacturers 
prior to and following the industry-wide price reductions of early 1996 (Cotterill, 1999, for 
example).  Consequently, it is important to put the data describing these firm’s strategies in 
context before analyzing the results of estimating the dynamic behavioral models described 
above. First, note from table 1 that General Mills has a leadership role in the Baltimore / DC 
market, but their local market share is considerably less than their share of the national market. 
Therefore, all of the results presented here should be interpreted as the realization of larger 
corporate strategies in a local market, rather than an indication of the overall performance. 
Second, note that total advertising and product development expenditure by Kellogg is 
significantly greater than that of General Mills, despite Kellogg’s slightly lower market share. 
However, the simple snap-shot provided by these summary statistics does not reveal the 
evolution of each firm’s strategic choices over time.  In fact, Kellogg has been spending less in 
all areas of marketing in recent years in order to lower costs -- a strategy that has resulted in 
sharply declining market share and the loss of their once-dominant market position to General 
Mills.  This table also does not show the general trend toward lower aggregate cereal sales across 
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the entire sample data period.  As U.S. consumers move more toward convenient meal solutions 
targeted to specific tastes and perceived nutritional requirements, mass-market ready-to-eat 
cereals are becoming less popular among working-age market segments.  Rather, new brands are, 
in fact, making inroads into niche markets such as woman-specific cereals, healthy snack-food 
alternatives, or as functional foods.  Further, generic and private label cereals, generally produced 
by Quaker Oats and Ralston, are making gains at the value-end of the market at the expense of 
the top two. These data are significant in two ways.  First, they highlight the importance of 
controlling for aggregate trends in demand when investigating firm-level changes in marketing 
strategy.  Second, in this competitive environment it is apparent that a better understanding of the 
effect and effectiveness of the wide array of tools available to cereal marketers is key to helping 
them design strategy, which places a premium on designing the best possible model of strategic 
interaction.5 
To determine which of the IAIDS or Lanchester models provides a better fit to the data, 
this section summarizes the results from each of the selection tests described above.  These 
results are presented in table 2.  First, the critical chi-square value for the J-test at a 5% level of 
significance and 4 degrees of freedom is 9.488.  Based on the Wald chi-square values in table 2, 
we fail to reject null hypotheses that the IAIDS specification is preferred to the Lanchester, but 
reject the opposite comparison.  Therefore, the J-test provides support for the IAIDS model 
relative to the Lanchester.  Second, although the LDC is designed to address cases in which other 
5 Although some studies of cereal demand consider the substitutability among specific brands within certain 
sub-categories such as “children’s cereals,” “adult cereals,” or “family cereals,” the objective of this study is to better 
understand firm-level market share strategies (Hausman 1997).  Consequently, the number of brands a firm sells is a 
strategic variable of considerable interest, the impact of which is lost by invoking assumptions of separability among 
cereal categories.  
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non-nested tests are inconclusive, we consider results from this test to help confirm the results of 
the J-test.  Using the selection criteria defined above, we find that L  - L  = 205.460, which is 2 1 
greater than C(n  - n1  + 1) - C(1) = 3.615.  By this test, therefore, we are again led to prefer the 2 
IAIDS to the Lanchester model.  Finally, table 2 also shows that the IAIDS model performs 
significantly better than the Lanchester in predicting the market share of each manufacturer. 
Consequently, we estimate and interpret optimal strategies implied by the structural and response 
elasticities calculated from the IAIDS model.  
Comparing the sign and significance of each response parameter between the IAIDS and 
Lanchester models suggests situations in which reliance on a Lanchester model may provide 
misleading guidance for firm strategy.  In fact, comparing the parameter estimates between tables 
3 and 4 reveals some marked and significant differences.  Specifically, the estimates in table 3 
suggest that product development is the only effective strategy General Mills may use to increase 
market share, whereas the Lanchester model parameters in table 4 indicate that advertising is 
likely to be more effective than either product development or extending the product line.6 
Further, its rivals are able to take market share from General Mills through any of the other tools 
according to the IAIDS parameter estimates, while the Lanchester model suggests that only rival 
product development causes General Mills’ market share to fall.  On the other hand, Kellogg is 
able to raise market share through any of the three tools, and loses market share only to rival 
product development according to the IAIDS estimates.  Product development is not only less 
effective in the Lanchester model, but counterproductive as the parameter estimate is significant 
6 The results from the Lanchester model are very similar to those obtained by Erickson (1997), who 
estimates a similar model of dynamic rivalry in the ready-to-eat cereal industry.  However, he does not restrict the 
scale parameter to 0.5 as we do, nor does he consider the likely simultaneity of each marketing tool. 
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and less than zero. The Lanchester model also suggests that Post is only able to increase market 
share by advertising and loses market share to advertising by its rivals.  
Clearly, using these results to guide marketing strategy would sacrifice the potential 
benefits attributable to both product development and brand introduction that are implied by the 
IAIDS model results.  Given that firms rarely introduce new products without advertising, and 
never without some prior commitment to significant product development efforts, it is perhaps 
not surprising to find that advertising is complementary to the other tools.  Whereas the IAIDS 
model captures these complementary effects, the Lanchester model does not.  Further, the 
Lanchester model suggests an entirely different set of competitive threats to Post market share 
compared to the IAIDS model.  While all other firms’ advertising causes Post market share to fall 
in the Lanchester model, only product development and brand introductions are likely to do the 
same according to the IAIDS estimates.  This may be due to the fact that the IAIDS model is able 
to capture the impact of advertising and product creation on the total potential market size in 
addition to share, whereas the Lanchester focuses entirely on movements in share.  Finally, the 
IAIDS estimates indicate that Quaker has a relatively limited ability to raise market share by 
bringing new brands to market, whereas the Lanchester model would recommend both product 
introductions and product development as part of an optimal dynamic strategy.  However, the 
Lanchester results do not convey the significant negative impact that rival brand introduction 
may have on Quaker share that would arise if indeed the IAIDS results are more accurate.  
Although these comparisons provide valuable insight into the confidence that one may place in 
the strategy implied by one specification, elasticity measures provide better input to quantitative 
decision making. 
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Not only do the elasticity estimates in table 5 provide more intuitive, unit free estimates 
of the impact of each marketing tool, but they are more complete in the sense that their derivation 
takes into account the total response of one variable with respect to all direct and indirect effects 
of changes in other variables.  Consequently, while the structural response equations in the 
IAIDS model do not have a direct interpretation, the response elasticities indicate the nature of 
the response of each firm to strategic decisions taken by their rivals.  With these estimates, 
therefore, we are able to describe the strategies in a manner similar to Fudenberg and Tirole’s 
(1984) “top dog,” “fat cat,” “lean and hungry,” or “puppy dog” depending upon whether a firm 
overinvests to deter or accommodate a rival, or underinvests to do the same, respectively. 
Whereas the elasticities with respect to A , R , B , and q  in this table measure the direct effect of i i i i 
each type of investment, the reaction elasticities indicate the nature of the indirect, or strategic 
effect of rival investments.  For General Mills and Post, note that the strategic response to 
changes in each tool is negative (the bottom three lines in table 5), which implies that the set of 
tools considered here are strategic substitutes.  If these firms’ reaction curves slope downward for 
each tool, then in the context of the strategies observed since “Grape Nuts Monday” in 1996, we 
can interpret this behavior as each firm attempting to become “lean and hungry” to appear tough 
in the face of rival attempts to grab market share.  
In terms of the estimates presented in table 5, General Mills’ lean and hungry strategy 
means that it reacts to a 10% cumulative rise in advertising spending by all rivals with a 
reduction of just under 1.0% of its own, and that they react to rival product development in the 
same direction, but with about twice the intensity.  On the other hand, Kellogg responds to rival 
product development with a comparatively small increase in its own, but is relatively more 
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aggressive in attacking any move that would reduce their market share.  In contrast, Post is 
relatively less aggressive in response to new products than they are with respect to rivals’ 
strategies in either of product development, advertising or quantity.  Quaker is more similar to 
Kellogg as they have upward sloping reaction functions in advertising and product development, 
implying that they alone may opt to be a “puppy dog” in the face of reductions in either of these 
tools, but are also relatively aggressive in matching any output-based strategies by rivals.  For 
each of the other tools, however, they in effect signal their willingness to roll over and not 
compete aggressively for share in the future when they reduce their investment along with the 
other firms.  In fact, this explanation appears entirely plausible given Quaker’s advertising-to-
sales (A/S) and product development-to-sales (B/S) ratios relative to the industry leaders. 
Whereas General Mills and Kellogg operate under nearly identical 8% A/S and 2% B/S ratios, 
Quaker’s A/S ratio is only 1.5%, while its B/S ratio is far below industry average at 
approximately 1.6%.  This low level of investment may explain why advertising and product 
development by Quaker are relatively more effective compared to the other companies, simply 
because of diminishing marginal returns to any strategic variable.  Beyond these insights into the 
usage and effectiveness of each form of marketing rivalry in this particular oligopoly, the 
approach illustrated here may be valuable to market analysts in a wide variety of similar contexts. 
In particular, recognizing that strategic variables affect firm performance only indirectly 
through consumer demand is more consistent with marketing practice than a simple, mechanistic 
assessment of the tactical benefits of putting capital toward each marketing tool.  Indeed, well-
planned marketing decisions are taken with customer-oriented goals in mind so gains on rivals 
are achieved by reaching the same set of customers in a more effective way.  Therefore, strategic 
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goals are attained only if the primary goals are met first.  Further, this analysis shows that these 
strategic goals need not be phrased quantitatively in terms of a series of one-on-one interactions 
with rivals as in traditional oligopoly analysis, but rather as if each firm exists in a duopoly -- a 
duopoly consisting of itself and all other rivals.  This perspective not only serves to make 
dynamic empirical analysis of oligopolistic rivarly mathematically tractable, but also provides 
more general recommendations as to the optimal policy of any one industry member.  These 
results are also consistent with recent research conducted with similar, but more detailed data 
sets. 
In particular, Nevo (2001) finds that high price-cost margins in the ready-to-eat cereal 
industry are due more to consumers paying for preferred, differentiated products and 
manufacturers’ multi-product pricing strategies than they are to formal price-collusion.  While 
our results do not address these specific types of behaviors, our general conclusions are the same, 
namely that cereal manufacturers tend to compete intensely using non-price methods while fully 
exploiting their abilities to price as the market will bear. 
Conclusions 
This study develops a new empirical model of dynamic oligopolistic interaction with multiple 
strategic tools.  The primary insight of this model is that strategic decisions are reflected in 
performance variables (market share or total sales) only through their impact on consumer 
demand and not directly through market shares as is typically assumed.  Further, models of 
dynamic oligopoly strategy need not require multiple state variables to represent each firm’s 
market share if it is recognized that marketing managers typically take decisions from an “us 
versus them” perspective.  Each firm, therefore, considers its own market share as the only 
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relevant state variable.  
We demonstrate the empirical performance of this model by deriving a multiple-firm 
market share model in which advertising, product development, new brand introductions 
(product line extensions) and quantity changes are considered key strategic variables. 
Recognizing that each of these strategic variables is endogenous when a firm is engaged in 
strategic rivalry, the model includes equations representing the optimal dynamic response to 
changes in the state of the system (own and industry sales) by each firm in their use of each 
strategic tool.  The specific functional form for consumer-demand driven changes in market share 
that we choose to demonstrate this model is an inverse Almost Ideal Demand System (IAIDS), 
which also dictates the specific form of the marketing-tool response equations that we estimate. 
By estimating both the demand and strategic response equations together, we are able to provide 
a much better fit to a sample of ready-to-eat cereal manufacturer data than with a traditional 
market-share combat model.  
In fact, three different non-nested testing procedures show the statistical superiority of the 
IAIDS model relative to a dynamic Lanchester alternative.  All tests provide strong support for a 
dynamic IAIDS specification.  Comparing the strategy recommendations implied by each also 
reveals a significant difference between the two models.  In fact, these results suggest that policy 
decisions taken based on the results of the statistically inferior model could be seriously flawed. 
Further, errors may be both of commission by spending money on a tool with a negative impact 
on sales, or of omission if a potentially lucrative tool is avoided.  Finally, future research in this 
area would consider a wider range of marketing tools, and investigate which specific form of 
consumer demand model is most appropriate for analyzing dynamic strategic interactions.       
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Top Four Cereal Companies 
Variable N Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
M11 65 0.392 0.031 0.339 0.459 
M2 65 0.337 0.030 0.274 0.395 
M3 65 0.150 0.016 0.114 0.184 
M4 65 0.074 0.012 0.052 0.103 
P1 65 3.603 0.226 2.999 4.033 
P2 65 3.099 0.246 2.517 3.725 
P3 65 3.054 0.285 2.584 3.744 
P4 65 3.013 0.340 2.339 3.760 
Q1 65 52.396 5.157 40.920 62.576 
Q2 65 52.811 8.530 35.336 72.093 
Q3 65 23.775 3.843 15.759 33.581 
Q4 65 12.021 3.016 7.586 21.811 
A1 65 453.630 89.327 258.120 610.230 
A2 65 518.380 145.450 280.230 725.090 
A3 65 303.890 64.937 211.560 439.990 
A4 65 79.968 16.103 55.090 104.860 
R1 65 123.460 10.032 63.569 134.670 
R2 65 164.700 44.667 41.681 242.570 
R3 65 68.746 8.112 30.137 76.186 
R4 65 87.020 20.239 52.535 113.940 
B1 65 36.123 2.503 32.000 41.000 
B2 65 40.738 2.857 35.000 46.000 
B3 65 26.077 1.915 23.000 31.000 
B4 65 18.354 0.975 16.000 20.000 
1 In this table, the firm indices are defined as follows: General Mills = 1, Kellogg = 2, Post = 3, Quaker Oats = 4. 
The total share does not sum to 1.0 because firm 5, Ralston, is excluded from this table and from the system 
estimation to avoid singularity of the design matrix. Volume and expenditure data are in millions of current 
dollars. 
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Table 2. Results of Model Selection Tests: IAIDS v Lanchester Rivalry Models 
Criterion: Strategic Response Model 
RMSE:2 IAIDS Lanchester 
M1 0.006 0.029 
M2 0.005 0.427 
M3 0.003 0.008 
M4 0.004 0.073 
Theil’s U: 
M1 0.135 0.341 
M2 0.091 0.498 
M3 0.106 0.216 
M4 0.141 0.511 
J-Testt 4.128 273.408 
LDC (LLF Values) 1125.221 919.761 
1 The J-Test statistic is chi-square distributed with 4 degrees of freedom, while the LDC is chi-square distributed 
with the comparison rule given in the text. The null hypothesis for the J-test is that the parameters on the fitted 
market share values from the other model are jointly not significantly different from zero when included in the first 
as regressors. 
2  In this table, M1 =  General Mills market share, M2  = Kellogg market share, M  = Post market share, and M4 = 
Quaker Oats market share. 
3 
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Table 3. IAIDS Model Parameter Estimates: Ready-to-Eat Cereal - Baltimore / DC 
Market Share Equations: 
General Mills Kellogg Post Quaker Oats 
Variable Estimate 1 t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
Mi, t-1 0.015 1.101 0.002 0.132 -0.040* -4.047 -0.086* -3.425 
iln(A ) -0.004 -1.078 0.040* 32.682 0.016* 12.489 0.001 0.420 
-iln(A ) -0.007* -3.874 0.007* 5.314 0.002* 2.327 -0.007* -2.261 
iln(R ) 0.240* 14.893 0.048* 14.687 0.088* 16.201 0.009 1.545 
-iln(R ) -0.075* -8.142 -0.189* -18.491 -0.080* -14.071 0.014* 2.154 
iln(B ) -0.063* -4.738 0.056* 10.025 0.071* 18.144 0.024* 2.641 
-iln(B ) -0.084* -6.171 -0.002 -1.178 -0.067* -10.905 -0.024* -2.211 
iln(Q ) 0.056* 7.893 0.025* 5.017 0.043* 13.831 0.043* 15.459 
-iln(Q ) -0.029* -2.993 -0.054* -8.485 -0.033* -8.094 -0.017* -2.192 
ln(Q) -0.047* -41.958 0.001 1.684 -0.049* -74.826 0.027* 47.133 
R2 0.976 0.982 0.979 0.938 
Marketing Tool Response Functions:2 
i  -i  A  / M 0.498* 2.094 0.527* 24.481 0.503* 9.556 0.496* 3.669 
R 0.978 0.586 2 0.948 0.503 
i  -i  R  / M 0.498* 2.094 0.527* 24.481 0.503* 9.556 0.496* 3.669 
R 0.996 0.452 2 0.998 0.767 
i  -i  B  / M 0.498* 2.094 0.527* 24.481 0.503* 9.556 0.496* 3.669 
R 0.993 0.523 2 0.989 0.389 
i  -i  Q  / M 0.498* 2.094 0.527* 24.481 0.503* 9.556 0.496* 3.669 
R 0.978 0.291 2 0.991 0.371 
1 A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level. 
2 Note that each marketing tool response function identifies one unique parameter per firm due to the cross-
equation restrictions implied by the optimal dynamic solution. 
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Table 4. Lanchester Model Estimates: Ready-to-Eat Cereal - Baltimore / DC 
Market Share Estimates: 
General Mills Kellogg Post Quaker Oats 
Estimate 1 t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
Mi,t-1
R
1.318* 
-0.001* 
0.094* 
-0.049* 
0.125* 
-0.002* 
-0.001 
-0.192* 
-0.264* 
0.956 
7.870 
-22.356 
12.566 
-4.903 
3.027 
-7.714 
-0.947 
-5.312 
-2.197 
0.539 
0.003* 
-0.162* 
-0.095 
0.524 
0.032* 
-0.314 
0.843* 
-1.718 
0.968 
0.315 
7.829 
-7.339 
-1.784 
1.701 
11.254 
-1.877 
2.088 
-1.315 
1.531* 
0.000 
0.036* 
0.049* 
-0.071* 
0.001* 
-0.107* 
-0.141* 
0.096 
0.947 
5.428 
-0.854 
8.270 
5.799 
-2.004 
5.599 
-6.314 
-3.945 
0.675 
2.719 
-0.001* 
-0.026* 
0.133* 
0.128* 
-0.001* 
-0.067 
0.280* 
-0.958* 
0.824 
1.911 
-5.402 
-3.754 
6.276 
2.099 
-3.703 
-1.684 
2.185 
-2.291 
Marketing Tool Response Functions: 
Ai / 
2 
R
R 
i / 
2 
B
R 
i / 
2 
P
R 
i / 
2R 
M-i,t-1 
M-i,t-1 
M-i,t-1 
M-i,t-1 
7.010* 
0.217 
7.860* 
0.269 
3.570* 
0.284 
0.871* 
0.400 
44.095 
42.573 
57.067 
47.901 
55.679* 
0.975 
62.727* 
0.285 
32.113* 
0.160 
19.677* 
0.135 
102.460 
103.280 
132.150 
139.450 
192.300* 
0.203 
261.130* 
0.232 
83.275* 
0.261 
94.510* 
0.136 
125.390 
62.060 
127.900 
49.363 
5.519* 
0.174 
4.719* 
0.320 
3.592* 
0.272 
0.001 
0.196 
144.360
118.010
116.940
A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level.  All estimates obtained using NL 3SLS estimator. 
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Table 5. IAIDS Q-Flexibilities and Response Elasticities 
Firm 
GM  K  P  Q  
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
iQ -0.791* -38.795 -0.931* -66.034 -0.678* -34.351 -0.483* -13.322 
Q-i 0.003 0.115 -0.157* -8.562 0.058* 2.234 -0.526* -5.331 
A i -0.012 -1.078 0.116* 32.682 0.104* 12.489 0.015 0.419 
A-i -0.021* -3.875 0.021* 5.341 0.015* 2.327 -0.091* -2.261 
R i 0.688* 14.892 0.137* 14.687 0.556* 16.201 0.111 1.545 
R-i -0.215* -8.142 -0.542* -18.491 -0.504* -14.701 0.171* 2.153 
B i -0.180* -4.738 0.159* 10.025 0.449* 18.441 0.299* 2.641 
B-i -0.241* -6.171 -0.007 -0.237 -0.424* -10.905 -0.307* -2.211 
X 0.865* 269.211 1.003* 667.395 0.687* 163.977 1.337* 187.077 
iA  / -iA -0.070* -6.877 0.005* 2.243 -0.028* -3.689 0.007* 11.765 
iR  / -iR -0.019* -15.502 0.006* 9.647 -0.021* -14.579 0.022* 9.563 
iB  / -iB -0.007* -7.143 -0.006* -3.781 -0.002 -1.859 -0.015* -2.747 
Q i/ Q -i  -0.583* -4.019 -0.640* -4.383 -0.523* -7.425 -0.326* -9.444 
1 The Q estimates are flexibilities rather than elasticities.  All remaining parameters reported here are elasticities.  
Values below the elasticity estimates are t-ratios.  A single asterisk indicates significance at a 5% level. The strategic 
variables are defined as follows: A = advertising, R = product development expenditure, B = product line length 
(number of brands) 
and Q = quantity. 
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